Games of Strategy

 

Reviews:

"Using Games of Strategy, students everywhere will be able to enjoy an early introduction to the field. The generous variety of illustrative cases has the effect that what is learned can be more easily retained than if there were only the assertions of theoretical concepts without enlightening examples."

???John F. Nash, Jr., Nobel Laureate, Princeton University

"To know game theory is to change your lifetime way of thinking. Games of Strategy is a delightful skeleton key to the twenty-first century's emerging culture."

???Paul A. Samuelson, Nobel Laureate, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

"Games of Strategy is a detailed, accurate, and highly entertaining exposition that will open up a new world for novices... Each example is artfully chosen to illustrate one of the central puzzles in the analysis of strategic behavior."

???Vincent P. Crawford, Economics, University of California, San Diego and University of Oxford

"I would like to commend the authors for writing a book that has such intellectual and analytical depth, and yet at the same time is accessible and entertaining. Well done!"

???Lynne Pepall, Economics, Tufts University

"This is a superb nontechnical introduction to game theory. The exposition is delightfully entertaining."

???Galina A. Schwartz, University of California, Berkeley

"This text has no rival."

???Sudesh Mujumdar, University of Southern Indiana Business School

"I decided to teach an undergraduate game theory class because of this book. It is very intuitive and well written, but at the same time it is an unvarnished version of game theory at the introductory level I appreciate that, since I want the students to be exposed to the real thing."

???Dennis Patterson, Political Science,

Texas Tech University

"Dixit, Skeath, and Reiley do an excellent job of providing examples that students can relate to... I continue to use the text because of positive student feedback; but more importantly, it has become clear to me that the text helps students learn more and gain a deeper understanding of game theory."

???Lisa J. Carlson, Political Science, University Of Idaho

Description:

Engaging and highly readable, Games of Strategy is a clear and comprehensive introduction to the study of game theory.

The third edition uses resonant, real-world examples to simplify complex theoretical ideas, helping students see the value of strategic thinking in a variety of situations.

Contents: 

Preface to the Third Edition ? Part One Introduction and General Principles ? Basic Ideas and Examples ? what is a game of strategy? ? Some examples and stories of strategic games ? Our strategy for studying games of strategy ? How to Think About Strategic Games ? Decisions versus games ? Classifying games ? Some terminology and background assumptions ? The uses of game theory ? the structure of the chapters to follow ? Summary ? Key terms ? Exercises ? Part Two: Concepts and Techniques ? Games with Sequential Moves ? Game trees ? Solving games by using trees ? Adding more players ? Order advantages ? Adding more moves ? Evidence concerning rollback ? Strategies in the survivor game ? Summary ? Key terms ? Exercises ? Simultaneous-Move Games with Pure Strategies I: Discrete Strategies ? Depicting simultaneous -move games with discrete strategies ? Nash equilibrium ? dominance ? Best -response analysis ? The minimax method for zero-sum games ? Three players ? Multiple equilibria in pure strategies ? No equilibrium in pure strategies ? Summary ? Key terms ? Exercises ? Simultaneous-Move Games with Pure Strategies II: Continuous Strategies and III: Discussion and Evidence ? Pure strategies that are continuous variables ? Eempirical evidence concerning nash equilibrium ? Critical discussion of the nash equilibrium concept ? rationalizability ? Summary ? Key terms ? Exercises ? Appendix: Finding a Value to Maximize a Function ? Combining Sequential and Simultaneous Moves ? Games with both simultaneous and sequential moves ? Changing the order of moves in a game ? Change in the method of analysis ? Three -player games ? Summary ? Key terms ? Exercises ? Simultaneous-Move Games with Mixed Strategies I: Two-by-Two Games ? What is a mixed strategy? ? Uncertain actions: mixing moves to keep the opponent guessing ? Nash equilibrium as a system of beliefs and responses ? Mixing in non-zero-sum games ? general discussion of mixed-strategy equilibria ? How to use mixed strategies in practice ? Evidence on mixing ? Summary ? Key terms ? Exercises ? Appendix: Probability and Expected Utility ? The basic algebra of probabilities ? Attitudes toward risk and expected utility ? Summary ? Key terms ? Simultaneous-Move Games with Mixed Strategies II: Some General Theory ? Best -response analysis ? Mixing when one player has three or more pure strategies ? Mixing when both players have three strategies ? More counterintuitive properties of mixed strategies ? Mixing among any number of strategies : general theory ? Summary ? key terms ? Exercises ? Part Three: Some Broad Classes of Games and Strategies ? Uncertainty and Information ? imperfect information: dealing with risk ? Asymmetric information: basic ideas ? direct communication, or "cheap talk" ? Adverse selection, signaling, and screening ? Equilibria in signaling games ? Evidence about signaling and screening ? summary ? Key terms ? Exercises ? Appendix: Inferring Probablilities from Observing Consequences 358 ? Summary ? Key terms ? Strategic Moves ? A classification of strategic moves ? Credibility of strategic moves ? Commitments ? Threats and promises ? Some additional topics ? Acquiring credibility ? Countering your opponent's strategic moves ? Summary ? Key terms ? Exercises ? The Prisoners? Dilemma and Repeated Games ? The basic game (review) ? Solutions I: repetition ? Solutions II: penalties and rewards ? Solutions III : leadership ? Solutions IV: asymmetric information ? Experimental evidence ? Real-world dilemmas ? Summary ? Key terms ? Exercises ? Appendix: Infinite Sums ? Collective-Action Games ? Collective-action games with Swo players ? Collective-action problems in large groups ? Spillovers, or externalities ? A brief history of ideas ? "help!": a game of chicken with mixed strategies ? Summary ? Key terms ? Exercises ? Evolutionary Games ? The framework ? Prisoners? dilemma ? Chicken ? The assurance game ? Interactions across species ? The hawk-dove game ? Three phenotypes in the population ? Some general theory ? Playing the field ? Evolution of cooperation and altruism ? Summary ? Key terms ? Exercises ? Mechanism Design ? Price discrimination ? Some terminology ? Cost -plus and fixed-price contracts ? Evidence concerning information revelation ? Mechanisms ? Incentives for effort: the simplest case ? Incentives for effort: evidence and extensions ? Summary ? Key terms ? Exercises ? Part Four: Applications to Specific Strategic Situations ? Brinkmanship: The Cuban Missile Crisis ? a brief narrative of events ? Simple game-theoretic explanation ? Accounting for additional complexities ? A probabilistic threat ? Practicing brinkmanship ? Summary ? Key terms ? Exercises ? Strategy and Voting ? voting rules and procedures ? Voting paradoxes ? General ideas pertaining to paradoxes ? Strategic manipulation of votes ? General ideas pertaining to manipulation ? The median voter theorem ? Summary ? Key terms ? Exercises ? Bidding Strategy and Auction Design ? Types of auctions ? The winner's curse ? bidding strategies ? Vickrey's truth serum ? All-pay auctions ? how to sell at auction ? Some added twists to consider ? Auctions on the internet ? Additional reading on the theory and practice of auctions ? Summary ? Key terms ? Exercises ? Bargaining ? nash's cooperative solution ? Variable-threat bargaining ? alternating-offers model I : total value decays ? Experimental evidence ? Alternating-offers model II : impatience ? manipulating information in bargaining ? Bargaining with many parties and issues ? Summary ? Key terms ? Exercises ? Markets and Competition ? A simple trading game ? The core ? The market mechanism ? The shapley value ? Fair division mechanisms ? Summary ? Key terms ? Exercises ? Glossary ? Index ?

About the Authors:

Avinash K. Dixit is John J.F. Sherrerd University Professor of Economics at Princeton University, where he offers his popular freshman course in game theory. He is among the world's leading economists, having made fundamental contributions in several major fields, including Game Theory. He is the author of many books, including Thinking Strategically (Norton, 1991), Investment Under Uncertainty (Princeton UP, 1994), and The Art of Strategy (Norton, 2009).

David H. Reiley, Jr. is Professor of Economics at the University of Arizona. He is also a researcher at Yahoo! Research and the National Bureau of Economic Research. He previously taught at Vanderbilt and Northwestern. Reiley is well known for his use of field experiments in economic research.

Susan Skeath is Professor of Economics at Wellesley College, where she teaches a number of courses in microeconomics, including the game theory course she introduced into the school's curriculum. Professor Skeath conducts research in international trade theory, and earned her doctorate at Princeton University.

Target Audience:
Students of Management and Economics.